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At a Meeting of Creditors held on February 20, 2009, counsel for
the trustee overseeing the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities, LLC, announced the advent of "clawback" suits seeking to
recover sums paid out to defrauded investors.' This Essay explains the
legal framework for the clawback suits and anticipates that many
investors in the Ponzi scheme 2 will not have submitted claims by the
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1. See Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Never Made Supposed Investments, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at Bl. The video recording of the Meeting of Creditors was
posted to www.madofftrustee.com, where it was publicly available. However, it was
subsequently removed. Readers interested in watching the recording can contact the
trustee at (888) 727-8695. See Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC
Liquidation Proceeding, http://www.madofftrustee.com/ (visited June 15, 2009).
2. A "Ponzi" scheme is a term generally used to describe an investment scheme
which is not really supported by any underlying business venture. The investors are
paid profits from the principal sums paid in by newly attracted investors. Usually those
who invest in the scheme are promised large returns on their principal investments. The
initial investors are indeed paid the sizable promised returns. This attracts additional
investors. More and more investors need to be attracted into the scheme so that the
growing number of investors on top can get paid. The person who runs this scheme
typically uses some of the money invested for personal use. Usually this pyramid
collapses and most investors not only do not get paid their profits, but also lose their
principal investments. In re Randy, 189 BR. 425, 437 n.17 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995). See
Robert Frank & Amir Efrati, 'Evil' Madoff Gets 150 Years in Epic Fraud: Victims
Cheer Tough Sentence: Judge Slams Financier for Stonewalling Investigators: True
Size of Losses Still a Mystery, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at Al; David Gardner,
Victims Rejoice as Madoff Is Hauled to Prison, DAILY MAIL (LONDON), Mar. 13, 2009,
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July 2, 2009 deadline, which may result in clawback litigation before
multiple courts. The Essay then discusses ways to streamline clawbacks
and other Madoff-related litigation so that investors who have already
been defrauded are not further damaged by the measures taken to
compensate them. It closes with an invitation for additional proposals.
I. CLAWBACKS IN THE MADOFF
LIQUIDATION PROCEEDING: AN OVERVIEW
While the liquidation proceeding of Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities, LLC is pending before the Bankruptcy Court,3 it is not a
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code.4 It is a proceeding under the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, as amended ("SIPA").5 On
December 15, 2008, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York appointed Irving Piccard to serve as the SIPA
trustee and transferred the SIPA proceeding to the Bankruptcy Court.6
A SIPA trustee can bring avoidance actions, colloquially referred to
as "clawbacks," pursuant to the preference and fraudulent transfer
at 32.
3. See SIPC v. Bernard L. MadoffInv. Sec. LLC, Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (BRL),
2009 Bankr. LEXIS 446 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & 2007 Supp.).
5. The purposes of a liquidation proceeding under this chapter shall be-
(1) as promptly as possible after the appointment of a trustee in such liquidation
proceeding, and in accordance with the provisions of this chapter-
(A) to deliver customer name securities to or on behalf of the customers of the debtor
entitled thereto as provided in section 78fff-2(c)(2) of this title; and
(B) to distribute customer property and (in advance thereof or concurrently therewith)
otherwise satisfy net equity claims of customers to the extent provided in this section;
(2) to sell or transfer offices and other productive units of the business of the debtor;
(3) to enforce rights of subrogation as provided in this chapter; and
(4) to liquidate the business of the debtor.
15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1970) (as amended).
6. See Application of the Securities Investor Protection Corp. at II & IX, SEC
v. Bernard L. Madoff v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. Civ. 08-10791, 2008
U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 65573, at **6, 12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(4) (2006) ("Upon the issuance of a protective decree and
appointment of a trustee, or a trustee and counsel, under this section, the court shall
forthwith order the removal of the entire liquidation proceeding to the court of the
United States in the same judicial district having jurisdiction over cases under Title 11.
The latter court shall thereupon have all of the jurisdiction, powers, and duties conferred
by this chapter upon the court to which application for the issuance of the protective
decree was made.").
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provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.7 Preference actions and fraudulent
transfer actions can reach both payments of fictitious profits and with-
drawals of principal. 8 On April 8, 2009, the trustee filed the first claw-
back action against investors in the Ponzi scheme. 9
A. Avoidance of Preferences
Through a preference action, the trustee can seek to recover
transfers (including transfers of money) made while Bernard L. Madoff
Investment Securities, LLC was insolvent, on or within the 90 days
before the December 11, 2008 commencement of the SIPA proceedings
(or in the case of transfers to an insider, within a year) provided that the
transfers were made to or for the benefit of a creditor and for or on
account of an antecedent debt, and allowed the targeted creditor to
receive more than it would have received in a hypothetical chapter 7
liquidation. 10 As one of the leading treatises on bankruptcy explains:
[P]reference law reaches back over a defined period prior to
bankruptcy and restructures transactions so as to level out the overall
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-l(a) (1970) (as amended) ("A [SIPA] trustee shall be vested
with the same powers and title with respect to the debtor and property of the debtor,
including the same right to avoid preferences, as a trustee in a case under Title 11.").
For an excellent discussion of clawback actions under the Bankruptcy Code in the
context of Ponzi schemes, see Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of
Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157 (1998). The term
"clawback" made headlines in early 2009 in an entirely different context when
insurance giant AIG paid out $165 million in employee bonuses after receiving
government bailout money. President Obama responded by ordering the Treasury
Secretary to pursue ways to cancel the bonuses. See, e.g., Colin Barr, Clawbacks Can't
Scratch AIG: Washington Wants to Tax AIG Bonuses into Submission. So Much for
Provisions Meant to Protect Taxpayers from Excessive Compensation in the First
Place, CNN MONEY, Mar. 18, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/17/news/
aig.bonusgate.fortune/index.htm.
8. A more detailed discussion of the elements of and defenses to actions seeking
the return of preferential payments and fraudulent transfers than the one that follows is
beyond the scope of this essay. See generally Hon. William H. Brown et al., Advanced
Issues in Avoidance, in 2007 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW SEMINAR MATERIALS (2007);
McDermott, supra note 7.
9. See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, Nos. 09APO 1154, 08-01789
(BRL), 2008 WL 5980300 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Apr. 9, 2008); Amir Efrati, Madoff Trustee
Sues Investors to Recover Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2009, at C1.
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006 & 2007 Supp.); see also id. §§ 547(c) (setting
forth preference defenses), 547(f) (creating a presumption of insolvency).
224 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LA W
treatment received by similar creditors. This does not imply that the
prepetition transfers avoided to accomplish this leveling were
immoral or improper when made. Rather, they are avoided because
their effect contravenes bankruptcy law concepts as to the economic
effects sought in a distribution of assets or income. I I
The most commonly invoked defenses are that the challenged
transfer was made in the "ordinary course of business"1 2 or the recipient
gave "new value" after the challenged transfer was made. 3  The
Bankruptcy Code sets out the ordinary course of business defense and
excepts from avoidance:
[T]ransfer[s] ...in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the
ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee [if the] transfer[s were] -
(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; or
(B) made according to ordinary business terms.14
It remains to be determined how the ordinary course of business
defense will be applied in the context of a cash-in, cash-out Ponzi
scheme, in which debts were incurred as part of an extraordinary and
unlawful enterprise and payments came from other people's money.
More straightforward, although also likely to be controversial in high-
stakes preference litigation, is the "new value" defense. Under Section
547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, a recipient of a challenged transfer
must show that "(i) the debtor received new value after the transfer, and
(ii) such new value remained unpaid" to establish a new value defense.' 5
New value, even in the context of the complex Madoff SIPA
proceedings, may simply be a new investment. 16
11. 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON, I1, NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 66:1 (3d ed. 2009).
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (2006 & 2007 Supp.).
13. Id. § 547(c)(4).
14. Id. § 547(c)(2). See generally 4 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 11, at § 66:19
(discussing the ordinary course of business defense).
15. In re Pameco Corp., 356 B.R. 327, 341 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing In re
Teligent, Inc., 315 B.R. 308, 315 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (2006 & 2007 Supp.) ("'[N]ew value' means money
or money's worth in goods, services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of
property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void
nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, including proceeds
of such property, but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing
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B. Avoidance of Fraudulent Transfers
Through a fraudulent transfer action, a trustee can undo both (1)
actual fraudulent transfers - transfers (including transfers of money) and
obligations made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors
and (2) constructive fraudulent transfers - transfers and obligations for
which less than reasonably equivalent value was received at a time when
the debtor was or would soon be insolvent. 7
The reachback period under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code is two years.18 The trustee can also invoke state law to recover
fraudulent conveyances.' 9 Under New York law, the statute of limi-
tations for fraudulent conveyance claims is six years. 20 As one of the
leading casebooks on bankruptcy law explains: "The purpose of fraud-
ulent conveyance law, whatever its form, is simple: it protects a debt-
or's unsecured creditors from reductions in the debtor's estate to which
they look, generally, for their security.''
A defendant can retain challenged transfers if it can prove it gave
"value" and acted in "good faith., 22  11 U.S.C. § 548's definition of
"value" is fairly intuitive and covers money put into the Ponzi scheme
by investors: "'value' means property, or satisfaction or securing of a
present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an un-
performed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the
obligation.").
17. See id. § 548(a).
18. See id.
19. See id. § 544(b).
20. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8) (McKinney 2009) ("[T]he time within which [an]
action [based upon fraud] must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the
date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff or the person
under whom the plaintiff claims discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable
diligence have discovered it."); In re Borriello, 329 B.R. 367, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2005) ("An action under New York law to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is
governed by the six-year statute of limitations for actions grounded in fraud,
commencing at the time of the conveyance.") (citing Island Holding, LLC v. O'Brien, 6
A.D.3d 498, 499-500 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)). New York State law is cited by way of
example of a state law on fraudulent conveyances. For a discussion of application of
choice of law principles to fraudulent conveyance actions, see, for example, Drenis v.
Haligiannis, 452 F. Supp. 2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
21. MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BusiNEss REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 387 (3d ed. 2006).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2006 & 2007 Supp.).
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debtor. ' '23 "Good faith" is a more elusive concept. It is not defined by §
548, but rather, has been construed by case law.
Many believe that a ruling on clawback issues in the bankruptcy
proceedings of Bayou Group, LLC 24 is instructive. 25  In Bayou, the
Bankruptcy Court held that defrauded investors had to disgorge ficti-
tious profits and could keep withdrawals of principal, but only to the
extent that they could prove that they did not make the withdrawals after
becoming aware of "red flags."2 6 The Court explained:
[Alny rational investor or financial advisor, on inquiry notice of a
warning signal respecting an investment, would be entirely justified
in requesting or recommending redemption and could not be
criticized for doing so. Indeed, it would be quite reasonable for an
investor to decide to redeem solely on the basis of the red flag
without making any inquiry, since the investor has no obligation to
any third party to make any inquiry. But if he does so, the courts
have held that he cannot invoke the good faith defense under Section
548(c).
The rule does not require that the "red flag" be of such specificity as
to put the recipient on "inquiry notice" of the actual fraud, or embez-
zlement, or looting, or whatever ultimately proves to be the cause of
loss. It is sufficient if the red flag puts the investor on notice of some
potential infirmity in the investment such that a reasonable investor
would recognize the need to conduct some investigation. 27
If this standard is used to assess the good faith of defrauded Madoff
investors, many may have to disgorge withdrawals of principal. This is
23. Id. § 548(d)(2).
24. In re Bayou Group, LLC, 396 B.R. 810 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
25. See, e.g., Carrie Coolidge, Lessons for Madoff Investors from the Bayou Fund
Ponzi Scheme, FORBES.COM, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/
madoff-redemptions-bayou-biz-wallst-cz cc1212madoff.html; Mark Hosenball, Made
Money with Madofj? Don't Count on Keeping It, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 2009, at 9; Jane
J. Kim, As 'Clawback Suits Loom, Some Investors Seek Cover, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12,
2009, at C3; Carlyn Kolker et al., Madoff Victims May Have to Return Profits,
Principal, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 23, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=awmAWSxKpXRM; Nicholas Varchaver, Added Insult to Madoff
Investors, CNNMoney, Dec. 19, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/19/news/
madoff.legal.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2008121913 (all drawing comparisons to
the Bayou ruling).
26. See In re Bayou Group, 396 B.R. 810, 844-51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
27. See id. at 848.
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because, in hindsight, the Ponzi scheme threw up a lot of red flags,
28
some of which may have contributed to withdrawals. It is thought, for
example, that there were investors who attributed the success of their
investments to front-running, but invested nonetheless because they did
not believe that the illegal practice would endanger their money.29 What
investors knew, and how they acted on it, will come out during the
discovery phase of clawback litigation.
It is significant that the Ponzi scheme flew under the radar of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.30 Investors invoking the good
faith defense will likely try to downplay evidence concerning suspicions
they had with respect to the remarkable success of their investments and
focus on the SEC's conduct, which the SEC investigated. 3' The
argument can certainly be made that an investor should not be deemed to
lack good faith based on red flags that the SEC did not spot.
C. Recovery of Avoided Transfers
If a challenged transfer is avoided, it can be recovered from not
only the initial transferee but also from those who received a transfer of
28. See GREG N. GREGORIOU & FRANCOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, MADOFF: A RIOT OF
RED FLAGS 10-15 (EDHEC Risk and Asset Management Research Centre Jan. 2009),
available at http://docs.edhec-risk.com/mrk/000000/Press/EDHECPPMadoffRiot
of Red Flags.pdf (discussing red flags including a track record so consistently
excellent that it should have raised suspicions; key positions held by members of the
Madoff family; a tiny staff considering the scale of the operations; obscure auditors who
were not peer-reviewed; feeder funds unable to obtain timely electronic access to their
accounts; and so forth).
29. See, e.g., Bernie Madoff" Ponzi Squared, ECONOMIST.COM, Dec. 15, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfmn?story_id=l 2795543
(subscription required) ("According to reports, some of those who put their faith in Mr.
Madoff suspected that he was engaged in wrongdoing, but not the sort that would
endanger their money. They thought he might be trading illegally for their benefit on
information gleaned by a separate business within his group, which made a market in
shares. The firm had been investigated for 'front-running,' using information about
client orders to trade for its own account before filling those orders.").
30. See 60 Minutes: The Man Who Knew (CBS television broadcast Mar. 1, 2009),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4836927n&tag-contentMain;
contentBody.
31. See, e.g., Rowena Mason, SEC Failed to Spot Madoff Fund's "Red Flags",
DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON) ONLINE, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/financetopics/bemard-madoff/4127360/SEC-failed-to-spot-Madoff-funds-red-
flags.html.
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the property from the initial transferee.32 This concept is important in
the Madoff SIPA proceeding because many investors received returns
on their investments indirectly through the hedge funds and other
intermediaries with which they invested.3 3 Both the intermediaries and
the investors are potential defendants in clawback litigation.
II. LIMITING THE REACH OF THE CLAW
The trustee mailed out 223 letters demanding the return of $735
million identified by his team as being subject to clawback.3 4  The
trustee acknowledged the publicity that the letters had drawn in a post on
www.madofftrustee.com:
In an effort to provide some transparency to this process, set forth
below are some of the factors that the Trustee will consider when
determining whether to commence an avoidance action.
- Generally speaking, but subject to the remainder of the bullet
points, all amounts recoverable as preferences must be repaid to the
Trustee. It may be possible to offset amounts received as preferences
against the maximum SIPC advance to the Trustee for the
satisfaction of each allowed customer claim.
- As to fraudulent transfers, was the customer a net "winner" or
"loser"? In other words, did the customer get back less from BLMIS
over the years than it put in. If so, the Trustee is unlikely to
commence an action.
- Would the commencement of an avoidance action create an undue
hardship for the customer that received the potentially avoidable
transfer(s)? If so, the Trustee is unlikely to commence an action.
When considering whether an action would create an undue
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2006).
33. Investors and governmental entities have sued some of these intermediaries.
See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Peshkin v. Tremont Group Holdings, Inc., No. 08-
11183 "(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2008); Complaint, Cuomo v. Merkin, No. 450879-
2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 6, 2009). Following the collapse of the Ponzi scheme, class
actions were also brought against Bernard Madoff. See, e.g., Complaint, Repex
Ventures S.A. v. Madoff, No. 09-00289 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009); Class Action
Complaint, Kellner v. Madoff, No. 08-5026 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2008); see also Lindsay
Fortado, Madoff Case Promises Fees for Firms Facing Worst Year in Decades,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103
&sid=aO32KOhrPtRw&refer=us
34. See Amir Efrati, Madoff's Net Losers Safe for Clawbacks, WALL ST. J., Apr.
24, 2009, at C8; Christopher Scinta et al., Madoff Trustee Demands Investors Return
$735 Million, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=2060111 0&sid=apnVhVeUN708.
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hardship, the Trustee will consider, among other things, the amount
sought to be recovered and the particular facts that would give rise to
the customer's hardship.
- Are there particular facts or circumstances-such as a lack of good
faith-that make the conduct of the recipient of the potentially
avoidable transfer susceptible to being recovered? If so, the Trustee
is more likely to commence an avoidance action.
* Does the recipient of the potentially avoidable transfer have
potentially valid defenses to the avoidance claims? If so, the Trustee
will evaluate the defenses when determining whether to commence
an action.
- Has the recipient of a demand letter contacted the Trustee's counsel
to discuss the facts and circumstances giving rise to the transfer and
potential settlements? If so, the Trustee will not commence an action,
if at all, while such discussions are taking place. If not, the Trustee
may be more likely to commence an action.
- Are there any other particular facts and circumstances brought to
the attention of the Trustee's counsel that the Trustee should
consider when determining whether to commence an avoidance
action against a recipient of funds?
35
The guidelines are subject to a disclaimer: "The Trustee offers the
foregoing solely as guidance and nothing herein creates any binding
agreement by the Trustee regarding whether he will or will not
commence any particular avoidance claim. The foregoing may not be
used in any way as a defense to any potential or actual avoidance
claim. ,36 While they do not eliminate the need to seek counsel, the
guidelines may offer some comfort to investors who had no reason to
suspect they were being defrauded and got much less out of the Ponzi
scheme over time than they put in.
The guidelines are also somewhat encouraging for defrauded
nonprofit organizations because they may be able to establish an "undue
hardship" under the third guideline. Nonprofits have been especially
hard hit by the Ponzi scheme. Some that invested heavily With Bernard
Madoff have lost substantially all of their assets, including The Elie
Wiesel Foundation for Humanity.37 Nonprofits have also seen a decline
35. See Guidance on the Trustee's Pursuit of Avoidance Recoveries, available at
http://www.madoff-help.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/05/picard-guidance_
avoidance.pdf.
36. See id. (emphasis in original).
37. See Elie Wiesel Says He Can't Forgive Bernie Madoff, CNN.COM, Feb. 27,
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/O2/27/wiesel.madoff/index.html; Stephanie
Strom, Elie Wiesel Levels Scorn at Madoff, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2009, at B 1.
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in donations both because those who donated to them in the past have
been defrauded and have less money to donate38 and because some
donors are losing confidence in the ability of nonprofits to safeguard
investments.3 9 The prospect of a clawback makes for a triple whammy.
Nonprofit organizations are not, however, getting a categorical pass; a
nonprofit affiliated with people with a close connection to Bernard
Madoff was named in one of the first clawback complaints filed by the
trustee.4°
III. THE IMPACT OF SUBMITTING A CLAIM
The trustee has reached out to investors to let them know that their
claims must be filed no later than July 2, 2009 in order to be
considered. 4' Timely filed customer claims will yield distributions from
SIPC 42 and other funds disbursed by the trustee. SIPC funding is cur-
rently capped at $500,000 per claim.43
The invitation to file claims has been called a "Trojan Horse" 44
because, as explained below, by submitting claims for recovery of net
38. See Associated Press, Charities Hurt in Madoff Case Get Charity: Foundations
Trying to Help Nonprofits That Lost Millions in Alleged Scheme, Jan. 6, 2009, available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28528375/.
39. See Elizabeth Bernstein, After Madoff, Donors Grow Wary of Giving: But You
Can Spot Red Flags Before You Write Out a Check; a Guideline for Vetting Charities,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2008, at Dl.
40. See Complaint, In re Madoff, No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2009),
available at http://www.madofftrustee.com/CourtFilings-Download.aspx?Docket=277
(naming as a defendant the Picower Institute for Medical Research).
41. According to the Securities and Exchange Commission and Securities Investor
Protection Corporation, on January 2, 2009, the trustee mailed claim forms to more than
8,000 customers and creditors of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. SEC,
Information for Madoff Customers, http://sec.gov/divisions/enforce/claims/
madoffsipc.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2009); Press Release, Securities Investor Protection
Corp., Madoff Liquidation Trustee Mails More Than 8,000 Customer Claims Forms
(Jan. 5, 2009), available at http://www.sipc.org/media/
release05Jan09.cfm.
42. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) was established pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (2006). See http://www.sipc.org for information about how SIPC
operates.
43. See Trustee Announces Hardship Program, http://www.madoffitrustee.com/
HardshipProgram.aspx. [hereinafter Hardship Program].
44. See, e.g., Robert Wayne Pierce, Madoff-The Trojan Horse and the Lion,
http://www.secatty.com/Madoff.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2009); Pamela A. MacLean,
A New Legal Industry: Madoff NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 2009, at 1.
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equity, 45 investors subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Bank-
ruptcy Court for clawbacks. Claims submitted by those with potential
clawback exposure are not eligible to receive a distribution of SIPC
funds until the clawback issues are resolved.46
The filing of a bankruptcy claim subjects the claimant to the
Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction. "The filing of a proof of claim by a
creditor is not merely a means of providing information to the bank-
ruptcy court, but is a submission to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to
establish that creditor's right to participate in the distribution of the
bankruptcy estate. By filing a claim against the estate, a creditor triggers
the process of allowance and disallowance of claims and an adversary
proceeding seeking recovery against the creditor becomes part of that
claims allowance process. 47 Likewise, submitting a claim in a SIPA
proceeding results in the claimant being deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court and forfeiting jury trial rights with
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 78111(11) (2006):
The term "net equity" means the dollar amount of the account or accounts of a
customer, to be determined by-
(A) calculating the sum which would have been owed by the debtor to such customer
if the debtor had liquidated, by sale or purchase on the filing date, all securities
positions of such customer (other than customer name securities reclaimed by such
customer); minus
(B) any indebtedness of such customer to the debtor on the filing date; plus
(C) any payment by such customer of such indebtedness to the debtor which is made
with the approval of the trustee and within such period as the trustee may determine
(but in no event more than sixty days after the publication of notice under section
78fff-(2)(a) of this title).
In determining net equity under this paragraph, accounts held by a customer in
separate capacities shall be deemed to be accounts of separate customers.
Id. Litigation has been commenced to challenge the trustee's method for calculating net
equity. See Noeleen G. Walder, Madoff Victims Blast Trustee's Valuations of Their
Investments, N.Y. L.J., June 11, 2009, at 1. See also Motion by Trustee for an Order to
Schedule Hearing on "Net Equity" Issue, SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC,
Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2009).
46. See, e.g., Germain v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323, 1327 (2d Cir. 1993)
("Under the Bankruptcy Code a court must disallow 'any claim of any entity from
which property is recoverable' because of a preferential transfer or fraudulent
conveyance" (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (1978)).). Perhaps there will be accelerated
distributions to individual investors who qualify for expedited payment under the
trustee's "Hardship Program." See Hardship Program, supra note 43.
47. In re Cruisephone, Inc., 278 B.R. 325, 330 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323
(1966)).
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respect to fraudulent transfer and preference actions.48
Investors seeking to preserve their jury trial rights may, therefore,
decide not to submit claims. Foreign investors may be especially leery
of submitting claims because courts consider whether a foreign
defendant has submitted a claim in determining whether they have
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 49 Funds that channeled their
clients' money into the Ponzi scheme, in particular, may forego the
opportunity to submit claims because with the benefit of the limited
SIPC funding that is available comes the risk of exposure to clawback
litigation in the Bankruptcy Court.
Other investors may decide not to file to maximize returns under
the new tax rules governing theft losses.5° The new tax rules and the
trustee's clawback guidelines both focus on how an investor fared
overall. The trustee's guidelines provide: "As to fraudulent transfers,
was the customer a net 'winner' or 'loser'? In other words, did the
customer get back less from BLMIS over the years than it put in. If so,
the Trustee is unlikely to commence an action." 5' The tax rules, in turn,
provide that "qualified investments" for purposes of calculating the
amount of a theft loss are based on the investor's net position.12  So,
under the guidelines and the new tax rules, respectively, some of the
48. See, e.g., In re Cont'l Capital Sec., No. 3:06-CV-02394-JGC, 2007 WL
5964307, at *'1-2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007); In re Blinder Robinson & Co., 135 B.R.
892, 896 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
49. See, e.g., Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Hanseatic Marine Serv. (In re Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co.), 207 BR. 282, 285-86 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
50. See I.R.S. REv. PROC. 2009-20 § 2.02 (2009) (regarding 26 C.F.R. § 601.105),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-09-20.pdf
51. See Guidance on the Trustee's Pursuit of Avoidance Recoveries, supra note
35.
52. See I.R.S. REV. PROC. 2009-20 § 4.06(l)(a)-(b).
(1) Qualified investment means the excess, if any, of-
(a) The sum of-
(i) The total amount of cash, or the basis of property, that the qualified investor
invested in the arrangement in all years; plus
(ii) The total amount of net income with respect to the specified fraudulent
arrangement that, consistent with information received from the specified fraudulent
arrangement, the qualified investor included in income for federal tax purposes for all
taxable years prior to the discovery year, including taxable years for which a refund is
barred by the statute of limitations; over
(b) The total amount of cash or property that the qualified investor withdrew in all
years from the specified fraudulent arrangement (whether designated as income or
principal).
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defrauded "net losers" may not be subject to clawback and may recover
a portion of their losses by way of tax relief. Conversely, investors who
are "net winners" may not file claims because they got more cash out of
the Ponzi scheme than they put in or withdrew their investments prior to
its collapse. 3 Other investors may not file claims because of privacy
concerns or may simply miss the deadline.
4
Some investors may file fruitless claims because they do not qualify
as customers. "Customer" is a term of art in the context of SIPA liquid-
dations.5 As one federal appellate court explained: "[Th]e definition
embodies a common-sense concept: An investor is entitled to compen-
sation from the SIPC only if he has entrusted cash or securities to a
broker-dealer who becomes insolvent; if an investor has not so entrusted
cash or securities, he is not a customer and therefore not entitled to
recover from the SIPC trust fund.",56 In other words, an indirect investor
whose money was channeled to Bernard L. Madoff Investment Secu-
rities, LLC by a fund, may be deemed ineligble to participate in SIPC
distributions.
Investors who do not file claims can consent to a bench trial before
the Bankruptcy Court57 or file a motion seeking removal of their actions
53. See Motion for an Order Modifying the December 23, 2008 Order Establishing
Deadlines for the Filing of Customer Claims, SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec.,
LLC, Adv. Pro. No. 08-1789-BRL (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.madofftrustee.com/CourtFilings-Download.aspx?Docket=261 (seeking
relief from deadline for filing claims for entities that did not have existing claims, but
could potentially file claims under Bankruptcy Code section 502(h) for any sums
disgorged through avoidance actions after the deadline); see also Order Denying
Motion to Modify Order Establishing Deadlines for the Filing of Customer Claims,
SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs., LLC, Adv. Pro. No. 08-1789-BRL (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.madofftrustee.com/CourtFilings-
Download.aspx?Docket-2 1.
54. SIPA sets time limitations on the filing of claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(a)(3)
(2006).
55. See Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78aaa et seq.) 23 A.L.R. FED. 157 § 18 (1975 &
Supp. 2008).
56. See In re Brentwood Secs., Inc., 925 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1991); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78111(2) (2006) (defining "customer").
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (2006).
If the right to a jury trial applies in a proceeding that may be heard under this section
by a bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy judge may conduct the jury trial if specially
designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court and with the express
consent of all the parties.
Id. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9015(b) (1998) provides:
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to District Court.58 In a press release dated May 14, 2009, the trustee
and the SIPC president announced that, as of the day before, 8,848
claims had been filed. 59 According to the trustee's First Interim Report,
as of July 9, 2009, the trustee had received over 15,400 customer
claims. 60 Assuming that not all of the investors sued by the trustee sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, clawback litigation will
be decentralized.61
IV. STREAMLINING LITIGATION
There is already a flurry of litigation outside of the Bankruptcy
Court. Class actions against Bernard Madoff and intermediaries have
been filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York.62  There is also Madoff-related litigation outside of the
Southern District.
63
International litigation may be on the horizon as well. Shortly after
the commencement of the SIPA liquidation, England's High Court of
Justice, Chancery Division, Companies Court ordered that Madoff
Securities International Ltd. be placed into a provisional liquidation and
appointed joint provisional liquidators. 64 The trustee has sought to em-
If the right to a jury trial applies, a timely demand has been filed pursuant to Rule
38(b) Fed. R. Civ. P., and the bankruptcy judge has been specially designated to
conduct the jury trial, the parties may consent to have a jury trial conducted by a
bankruptcy judge under 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) by jointly or separately filing a statement
of consent within any applicable time limits specified by local rule.
Id.
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2006); see also S.D.N.Y. LOCAL BANKR. R. 5011-1
(2008).
59. See Press Release, SIPC, SIPC: $61 Million in Commitments Made to Madoff
Claimants, With $100 Million Level Expected to be Reached by Memorial Day (May
14, 2009), available at http://www.madofftrustee.com/News-Download.aspx?Press
Release = 15.
60. See Trustee's First Interim Report for the Period December 11, 2008 Through
June 30, 2009 at 2 n.2, SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC, Adv. Pro. No. 08-
1789-BRL (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2009), available at http://www.madofftrustee.com/
CourtFilings-Download.aspx?Docket = 163.
61. See Kim, supra note 25 (discussing reluctance to file claims and investors'
asset protection strategies).
62. See supra note 33.
63. Id.
64. See Trustee's Motion to Retain Special Counsel Nunc Pro Tunc as of January
15, 2009 at 9, SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 08-01789
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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ploy Lovells LLP65 and other special counsel 66 to assist with issues
arising overseas and is coordinating with the joint provisional liqui-
dators.67 In the lead case on the international reach of preference actions
brought under the Bankruptcy Code, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit concluded that principles of comity counseled
against applying the preference provisions to avoidance claims asserted
in the Chapter 11 case of a debtor, which was subject to joint, coop-
erative proceedings in England.68 Perhaps the liquidators in London can
claw back transfers the trustee cannot otherwise reach.69
65. See id. at 11 (seeking authority to employ Lovells LLP "with regard to the
foreign proceeding of MSIL, and any matters related to other foreign proceedings").
66. See, e.g., Trustee's Motion for Authority to Retain Special Counsel Nunc Pro
Tunc as of February 8, 2009 at 11, SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, Adv.
Proc. No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (seeking authority to retain the law firm of
Eugene F. Collins as special counsel "with regard to the [proceedings before the High
Court in Dublin, Ireland], and any matters related to other proceedings in Ireland");
Trustee's Motion for Authority to Retain Special Counsel Nunc Pro Tunc as of March
13, 2009 at 10, SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 08-01789
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (seeking authority to retain the law firm of Attias & Levy as
special counsel "with regard to its recovery of customer property in Gibraltar, and any
related matters"); Trustee's Motion for an Order Approving the Retention of Schiltz &
Schiltz as Special Counsel Nunc Pro Tunc as of March 30, 2009 at 10, SIPC v.
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(seeking authority to retain the law firm of Schiltz & Schiltz as special counsel "with
regard to its recovery of customer property in Luxembourg, and any related matters").
67. Order Pursuant to Sections 1526, 1527 and 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
Approving Protocols by and Between the Trustee and the Joint Provisional Liquidators
of Madoff Securities International Limited, SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC,
Adv. Proc. No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
68. See In re Maxwell Comm. Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
69. In a judgment issued on February 12, 2009, the European Court of Justice held
"that the courts of the Member states within the territory of which insolvency
proceedings have been opened have jurisdiction to decide an action to set a transaction
aside by virtue of insolvency that is brought against a person whose registered office is
in another Member State." See Case C-339/07, Christopher Seagon, in his capacity as
liquidator in respect of the assets of Frick Teppichboden Supermarkte GmbH v. Deko
Marty Belgium NV, 2009 E.C.J. Eur.-Lex LEXIS 120 (Feb. 12, 2009). The trustee for
Bernard Madoff's Chapter 7 estate can also bring avoidance actions. An involuntary
petition for relief was filed against Bernard Madoff in April of 2009 and, thereafter, a
trustee was appointed. While the Chapter 7 estate was consolidated into the estate of
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC, the Chapter 7 trustee retained the
ability to bring avoidance actions under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code. See
Consent Order Substantively Consolidating the Estate of Bernard L. Madoff into the
SIPA Proceeding of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and Expressly
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The foregoing demonstrates that there is great potential for
inconsistent results, delayed adjudication, and skyrocketing costs. As a
result, the need for streamlining and coordinating the Madoff-related
civil litigation is acute. Procedures utilized in some complex cases
follow by way of suggestion.
A. Collins & Aikman: Setting Deadlines
& Establishing Mediation Procedures
On May 17, 2005, Collins & Aikman Corporation and affiliates
sought Chapter 11 protection. 70 The debtors and their domestic and for-
eign non-debtor affiliates were leading global suppliers of automotive
parts, with total sales of approximately $4 Billion in 2004, 7 ' and there
were approximately 75,000 creditors in the Chapter 11 cases.72
The debtors identified thousands of potentially voidable preferential
and fraudulent transfers, which were made by the debtors during the 90
days preceding the bankruptcy submitting.73 Special Counsel retained
on a contingency fee basis filed over 1,100 complaints, each of which
sought recovery from recipients of transfers during the preference period
totaling more than $25,000. 7
4
The Bankruptcy Court entered Orders to facilitate the resolution of
the high volume litigation. Prior to the commencement of the cases, the
Court put procedures into place that, among other things, set omnibus
hearing dates and deadlines for (1) serving complaints and motions to
amend complaints; (2) submitting answers to complaints and responses
Preserving all Rights, Claims and Powers of Both Estates at E, F, G, 3 & 4, SIPC v.
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 9,
2009).
70. See First Day Motion for Entry of an Order Designating Cases as "Large
Bankruptcy Cases," In re Collins & Aikman Corp., Chapter 11 Case No. 05-55927
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 17, 2005), available at http://www.kccllc.net/documents/
0555927/0555927050517000000000055.pdf.
71. See id. at 5-6.
72. See id. at 10.
73. See In re Collins & Aikman, Third Semi-Annual Report of the Collins &
Aikman Litigation Trust Administrator in Accordance with Section 4.4(d) of the C & A
Litigation Trust Agreement, Aug. 13, 2009, at 2, available at http://www.kccllc.net/
documents/0555927/0555927090813000000000001.pdf [hereinafter Collins & Aikman
Report].
74. See id. at 2-3.
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to motions to amend complaints; and (3) discovery.75
The Bankruptcy Court subsequently "conclude[d] that it [was] in
the best interests of all of the parties in these adversary proceedings to
appoint mediators to attempt to facilitate resolutions of these adversary
proceedings." The Court also "conclude[d] that the mediation proce-
dures established in [the Order Regarding Mediation] will promote the
just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of these adversary pro-
ceedings.76 The Order Regarding Mediation, among other things, (1)
stayed all actions in which a responsive pleading had been filed; (2)
appointed mediators; (3) required that mediations take place three days
each week; (4) established rules governing conduct of mediations; (5)
fixed costs; and (6) provided conflict and opt-out provisions.77
The results of the procedures put into place by the Bankruptcy
Court are remarkable. As of June 30, 2009, fewer than thirty cases re-
mained open, and nearly $50 Million had been recovered through res-
olution of the balance of the preference cases.78
B. Enron: The MegaComplaint
& Coordinating Multidistrict Litigation
After the infamous collapse of Enron and the ensuing bankruptcy
submittings,79 the Enron debtors filed a complaint in Enron's bankruptcy
proceedings alleging multiple causes of action, including clawbacks,
against Enron's former lender banks (the "MegaComplaint"). 80 In the
75. See, e.g., Order Establishing Procedures and Deadlines for Adversary
Proceedings "Track 1," No. 05-55927 (SWR), In re Collins & Aikman Corp. (E.D.
Mich. May 1, 2007). Parallel Orders were entered for cases brought in Tracks II and
111, in which the debtors sought recovery of greater amounts. See, e.g., Procedures and
Deadlines for Adversary Proceedings "Track 2," No. 05-55927 (SWR), In re Collins &
Aikman (E.D. Mich. May 1, 2007).
76. In re Collins & Aikman Corp., 376 B.R. 815, 816 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007).
77. See id. at 816-17.
78. See Collins & Aikman Report, supra note 73, at 1, 5-6 (discussing outstanding
results achieved by Togut, Segal & Segal LLP).
79. See generally In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,
2002), First Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, available at
http://www.enron.com/media/lstExaminers Report.pdf (describing Enron's collapse
and some of the transactions preceding it).
80. See Reorganized Debtors' Fourth Amended Complaint for the Avoidance and
Return of Preferential Payments and Fraudulent Transfers, Equitable Subordination, and
Damages, Together with Objections and Counterclaims to Creditor Defendants' Claims,
Enron Corp. v. Citigroup Inc., No. 01-16034, Adv. No. 03-09266 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10,
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MegaComplaint, Enron sought a recovery from "the banks and
investment banks that bear substantial responsibility for the stunning
downfall of what was once the seventh largest corporation in the United
States" based on a "multi-year scheme to manipulate Enron's financial
statements and misstate its financial condition."'" The MegaComplaint
consolidated, in a single proceeding, thousands of actions collectively
seeking recovery of Billions of Dollars, based on bankruptcy causes of
action and related claims under state and common law.82
Outside of the Bankruptcy Court, shareholders filed more than
seventy class actions seeking damages for their losses, which were
transferred to the Southern District of Texas by the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation.83 This was done pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407,
which provides: "When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be
transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings. 84 Actions can be transferred by either the judicial panel
on multidistrict litigation, by its own initiative, or by motion to the panel
filed by a party to an action seeking to coordinate or consolidate pretrial
proceedings.85
By coordinating with respect to pretrial matters, through measures
such as jointly entering a Deposition Protocol Order,8 6 the Bankruptcy
Court and the District Court streamlined discovery and facilitated reso-
lution of highly complex issues. The coordinated litigation resulted in a
$7.2 billion shareholder settlement. 87  According to Enron Creditors
Recovery Corp., payouts to creditors are in excess of $21.5 billion.88
2005).
81. See id. at 1.
82. See id. Enron also filed complaints asserting multiple causes of action against a
host of defendants as part of the Commercial Paper Litigation and Equity Transactions
Litigation. For descriptions of these lawsuits, see http://www.enron.com/index.php?
option=comcontent&task=section&id=3&Itemid=4 (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
83. See Newby v. Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 2002).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).
85. See id. § 1407(c).
86. See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., Deposition Protocol Order (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Mar. 11, 2004).
87. See Kristen Hays, Enron Payout Plan Approved. Shareholders May See Some
Money Before the End of the Year, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 9, 2008, at Bus. 1.
88. See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., Payments to Date (Apr. 1, 2009),
http://www.enron.com/index.php?option=com-content&task-view&id=l 5&Itemid=25
(last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
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CONCLUSION
The clawback actions and other litigation arising out of the collapse
of the Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Bernard Madoff will try to right
many wrongs. Thought should be to how to achieve resolution without
compounding the damage already suffered. The procedures in complex
Chapter 11 proceedings described above maximized returns and reduced
both costs and delay. Proposals for the resolution of Madoff-related
litigation should come sooner rather than later and are hereby invited.
Notes & Observations
